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NEW LIMITS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT-State v. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d 542, 693 P.2d 108
(1985).
In State v. Schwab, I the Washington Supreme Court removed residential
landlord-tenant transactions from the purview of the Washington Con-
sumer Protection Act (CPA). 2 Under Schwab, litigants may no longer
invoke the generous remedial provisions of the CPA to enforce tenants'
rights granted by the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act. 3 Schwab also
eliminated state prosecution of residential landlord-tenant actions. 4 The
reasoning used by the court could prevent the application of the CPA to new
areas of commerce, and may also limit its application in areas where it
previously has been considered fully applicable.
I. BACKGROUND
The Washington Consumer Protection Act prohibits unfair or deceptive
practices in trade or commerce. 5 The CPA authorizes both the attorney
general and private citizens to bring actions for relief under the Act.6
Actions under the CPA are based upon conduct which is unfair or deceptive
as defined either by statute or by consumer protection case law.7 The
conduct also must be within trade or commerce, 8 and not specifically
exempted from the CPA.9 In addition, private plaintiffs must satisfy a
1. 103 Wn. 2d 542, 693 P.2d 108 (1985).
2. Id. at 553, 693 P.2d at 113-14; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 19.86 (1983).
3. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 553, 693 P.2d at 113-14; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 59.18 (1983).
4. Landlord-tenant complaints are consistently among the top five categories of complaints
received by the state attorney general's office. Interview with John R. Ellis, Deputy Attorney General,
Chief of the Consumer and Business Fair Practices Division of the Washington Attorney General's
Office, in Seattle, Washington (October 18, 1985) (notes on file with the Washington LaivRevieiv). Prior
to Schwab, the state assumed that it had jurisdiction under the CPA to handle landlord-tenant cases. Id.
The Attorney General's office intends to seek legislation during the 1986 Legislative session to reinstate
the state's jurisdiction over landlord-tenant issues. Id.
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1983) prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce .. "
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.080 (1983) allows the attorney general to bring an action under the
CPA for injunctive relief, attorney's fees, consumer restitution, and any additional relief that the court
deems necessary. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1983) allows any person who is injured in his
business or property to bring an action under the CPA for injunctive relief, actual damages, discretion-
ary treble damages (up to $10,000), court costs, and attorney's fees.
7. Cordell v. Stroud, 38 Wn. App. 861, 864, 690 P.2d 1195, 1197-98 (1984).
8. WASHINGTON STATE BAR Ass'N, III WASHINGTON COMMERCIAL LAW DESKBOOK § 27.4(b), at
27-7 to 27-9 (1982). See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010(2) for the statutory definitions of "trade" and
.commerce."
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (1983) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to actions or transactions otherwise permitted, prohibited or
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public interest requirement. 10
In consumer protection actions based upon statutory violations, most
plaintiffs utilize the per se doctrine.l' As originally expressed in State v.
Reader's Digest, 12 the doctrine provides that conduct which is both illegal
and against public policy is per se an unfair trade practice within the
meaning of the CPA. 1 3 The public policy requirement is met by showing
that the illegal conduct violates public policy as declared by the legislature
or the judiciary.14 The supreme court has held that violation of a statute
which contains a "specific legislative declaration" of public interest estab-
lishes that the prohibited conduct is against public policy,' 5 and that the
action involves the public interest. 16
regulated under laws administered by the insurance commissioner of this state, the Washington
utilities and transportation commission, the federal power commission or actions or transactions
permitted by any other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or
the United States ....
See generally Comment, The Scope of the Regulated Industries Exemption Under the Washington
Consumer Protection Act, 10 GONz. L. REv. 415 (1975).
10. The Washington Supreme Court developed a three-part test for meeting the public interest
requirement in Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn. 2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 (1980). The plaintiff must show: (I) the
defendant, by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce, has induced the
plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (2) the plaintiff suffers damage brought about by such action or
failure to act; and (3) the defendant's deceptive acts or practices have the potential for repetition. Id. at
46, 614 P.2d at 188. The public interest requirement may also be satisfied if there is a "specific
legislative declaration" of public interest. Haner v. Quincy Farm Chemicals, 97 Wn. 2d 753, 762, 649
P.2d 828, 833 (1982). See also Comment, The Consumer Protection Act Private Right of Action: A
Reevaluation. 19 GONZ. L. REv. 673 (1983/84): Comment, Washington Consumer Protection Act-
Public Interest and the Private Litigant, 60 WASH. L. REv. 201 (1984); Comment, Private Suits Under
Washington's Consumer Protection Act: The Public Interest Requirement. 54 WASH. L. REV. 795
(1979).
1I. In the consumer protection context, the phrase "per se" has been used in connection with three
distinct concepts. The supreme court originally introduced the per se doctrine to define "per se unfair or
deceptive practices." State v. Reader's Digest, 81 Wn. 2d 259, 270, 276, 501 P.2d 290, 298. 301-02
(1972). Next, in Haner v. Quincy Farm Chemicals, 97 Wn. 2d 753, 762, 649 P.2d 828, 833 (1982). the
court developed a per se public interest doctrine. Finally, in McRae v. Bolstad, 101 Wn. 2d 161. 165.676
P.2d 496, 499 (1984), the court used the phrase "per se violation" in conjunction with the Reader's
Digest test. The McRae opinion, however, does not indicate a relationship between the phrase "per se
violation" and the doctrines defining per se unfair practices and per se public interest. This Note uses the
phrase "per se" only to signify "per se unfair or deceptive practices."
12. 81 Wn. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
13. Id. at 270,276,501 P.2d at 298, 301-02. A successful per se action under the CPA also requires
showing (1) the existence of a pertinent statute; (2) the violation of that statute; (3) that such violation
was the proximate cause of damages sustained; and (4) that the plaintiff was in the class of people the
statute was designed to protect. Magney v. Lincoln Mutual Savings Bank, 34 Wn. App. 45, 57. 659
P.2d 537, 544 (1983).
14. Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 350, 358, 581 P.2d 1349, 1351 (1978).
15. Id. at 359, 581 P.2d at 1351.
16. Haner, 97 Wn. 2d at 762, 649 P.2d at 833. Because the Reader's Digest public policy
requirement and the private litigant's public interest requirement can be established by the same
legislative declaration, the courts occasionally have failed to distinguish the two requirements. See,
e.g., Crane & Crane v. C & D Electric, 37 Wn. App. 560, 683 P.2d 1103 (1984). In Crane, the court
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Since the language used to express public policy varies between statutes,
courts have applied the per se doctrine unpredictably. 17 The legislature has
provided some clarification by incorporating into selected statutes provi-
sions which directly link the violation of the statute to the CPA. 18 While the
language of these provisions also varies, most declare that violations of the
statute constitute unfair or deceptive practices for the purpose of applying
the CPA. Under Schwab, this type of provision may become a prerequisite
to the application of the CPA.
II. THE SCHWAB DECISION
Anthony Schwab owned and rented several submarginal residential
housing units. 19 Schwab prepared handwritten rental agreements which
generally provided that the tenant would take the premises on an "as is"
basis and would not receive landlord services.20 In response to complaints
from tenants, the Consumer and Business Fair Practices Division of the
stated that the electrical installations statute, WASH. REv. CODE ch. 19.28 (1983), did not contain a
specific declaration of public interest and therefore could not be used to meet the public policy
requirement of the Reader's Digest test. 37 Wn. App. at 566, 683 P.2d at 1107-08.
17. Compare wilkinson v. Smith, 31 Wn. App. 1, 639 P.2d 768 (1982), andNuttall v. Dowell, 31
Wn. App. 98, 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (holding that the violation of the Real Estate Brokers Act, WASH.
REV. CODE ch. 18.85 (1983), will support a per se consumer protection action) with Sato v. Century 21
Ocean Shores Real Estate, 101 Wn. 2d 599, 681 P.2d 242 (1984) and Cordell v. Stroud, 38 Wn. App.
861, 690 P.2d 1195 (1984) (holding that the violation of the Real Estate Brokers Act, WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 18.85 (1983), will not support a per se consumer protection action). The ruling that the Real Estate
Brokers Act will not support a per se consumer protection action has been applied retroactively. Harstad
v. Frol, 41 Wn. App. 294, 300, 704 P.2d 638, 642 (1985).
18. E.g., the Telephone Buyer's Protection Act, WASH. REv. CODE § 19.130.060-.901 (1984),
declares violations of that statute to be a violation of the CPA.
Several statutes merely declare that violations constitute unfair or deceptive practices under the CPA,
including: WASH. REv. CODE § 18.28.185 (1983) (debt adjusting); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.35.180
(1983) (hearing aids); WASH. REv. CODE § 18.39.350 (1983) (embalmers and funeral directors); WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.09.340 (1983) (charitable solicitations); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.52.036 (1983)
(interest rates); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.102.020 (1983) (chain distributor schemes); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.110.170 (1983) (business opportunities); WASH. REv. CODE § 28B.05.230 (1983) (educational
institutions); WASH. REv. CODE § 46.71.070 (1983) (auto repair); WASH. REv. CODE § 58.19.270
(1983) (land development); WASH . REv. CODE § 63.10.050 (1983) (consumer leases); WASH. REV.
CODE § 64.36.170 (1983) (time share offerings); and WASH. REv. CODE § 68.46.210 (1983) (prear-
rangement contracts).
In addition, several statutes only declare that selected violations constitute unfair or deceptive acts
under the CPA including: WASH. REv. CODE § 19.16.440 (1983) (collection agencies); WASH. REv.
CODE § 19.100.190(1) (1983) (franchise investments); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.105.500 (1983) (camp-
ing clubs); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.440(2) (1983) (mobile home installation); and WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.030(3) (1983) (discrimination).
19. State v. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d 542, 544, 693 P.2d 108, 109 (1985).
20. Id.
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State Attorney General's office investigated Schwab's rental practices and
filed suit under the CPA. 2'
The trial court found that Schwab's rental practices were in direct
violation of the CPA. 22 The trial court also found that Schwab had repeat-
edly violated the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, 23 and that those viola-
tions constituted per se violations of the CPA. 24 Schwab appealed, and at
the request of the Attorney General the case was certified to the Washington
Supreme Court. 25
The supreme court reversed the trial court and dismissed the action.2 6
The court held that residential landlord-tenant transactions were not within
the scope of the CPA, either directly through that act or indirectly through
the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and the per se doctrine. 27 The court
specifically rejected the argument that the violation of any consumer-
oriented statute constitutes a per se violation of the CPA. 28 Instead, the
court adopted a legislative history analysis to determine whether landlords
would be regulated under the CPA.
The court's analysis focused on three factors. First, the court found
nothing in the legislative history of the CPA to indicate that the act was
intended to regulate landlord-tenant issues. 29 Second, the court found the
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act to be a comprehensive and well-consid-
ered statute containing extensive remedial provisions. 30 Third, the court
identified several statutes which, unlike the Residential Landlord-Tenant
Act, explicitly link the violation of the statute to the CPA. 31 The court
emphasized that the legislature had rejected a proposed amendment to the
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act which would have provided that any
violation of the act would constitute an unfair or deceptive practice under
the CPA. 32 The court concluded that these three factors clearly indicated a
legislative intent not to regulate landlord-tenant transactions under the
CPA.
21. Id.
22. State v. Schwab, No. 80-2-14524-0, slip op. at 6-7 (Wash. Super. Ct. King Co. Feb. 1. 1983).
23. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 544, 693 P.2d at 109.
24. State v. Schwab, No. 80-2-14524-0, slip op. at 6-7 (Wash. Super. Ct. King Co. Feb. 1, 1983).
25. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 543, 693 P.2d at 109. The Attorney General's office requested
certification to the supreme court and stated that "because of the significant impact that a ruling on any
issue adverse to the state would have, it is probable that legislative changes would need to be sought."
Id. See supra note 4.
26. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 554, 693 P.2d at 114.
27. Id. at 553, 693 P.2d at 113-14.
28. Id. at 548-49, 693 P.2d at 111- 12.
29. Id. at 549, 693 P.2d at 112.
30. Id. at 550, 693 P.2d at 112.
31. Id. at 546-47, 693 P.2d at 110-11.
32. Id. at 552, 693 P.2d at 113.
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I. ANALYSIS
The court in Schwab departed from precedent to establish new limits to
the application of the CPA. Although both the court and the legislature had
declared that conduct in violation of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act
was against public policy, 33 the Schwab court refused to allow a per se
consumer protection action. The court disregarded the Reader's Digest per
se doctrine and claimed to exercise the process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion. 34 The phrase "judicial inclusion and exclusion," also intro-
duced in Reader's Digest, was coined to describe the process used by the
court to define what practices are unfair or deceptive. 35 The court extended
the application of this process by using it to define the areas of commerce
that should be regulated under the CPA. This analysis in effect supplements
the legislature's exemption-provision 36 with a judicially created exemption
for landlord-tenant conduct. The courts and the legislature now are faced
with the task of defining the limits of this new analysis.
A. Effect of Schwab on the Per Se Application of the CPA
After years of modifying and redefining the per se doctrine, the court
again has failed to establish a clear standard for the application of the
doctrine. Litigants must continue to guess at exactly what characteristics a
statute must possess in order to provide the basis for a per se consumer
protection action.
1. Schwab's Legislative Intent Analysis
Extracting a clear standard from the Schwab decision is difficult since
the court failed to indicate the relative importance of each factor upon
which the decision was based. 37 The court indicated that the lack of
legislative history showing an intent to link the Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act with the CPA was, in itself, insufficient to cause the exclusion of
landlord-tenant conduct from the CPA.38 In addition, the court previously
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.230(1) (1983) provides that "[a]ny provision of a lease or other
agreement, whether oral or written, whereby any section or subsection of this chapter is waived...
shall be deemed against public policy and shall be unenforceable." In Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wn. 2d 22,
515 P.2d 160 (1973), the court stated that public policy requires that disadvantaged tenants not be placed
in the position of agreeing to live in uninhabitable premises. Id. at 28, 515 P.2d at 164.
34. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 548, 693 P.2d at Ill.
35. State v. Reader's Digest, 81 Wn. 2d 259, 275, 501 P.2d 290, 301 (1972).
36. See supra note 9.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
38. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 550, 693 P.2d 112.
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had indicated that an area of conduct would not be excluded from the CPA
based solely upon the existence of other remedies at law. 39 Apart from these
two narrow guidelines, however, the court has not indicated whether some
other combination of the factors identified in Schwab would be sufficient to
preclude the use of a given statute as the basis for a consumer protection
action. In fact, the court left open the possibility that the third factor, the
legislature's rejection of an amendment linking the statute with the CPA,
may be sufficient by itself to prevent the use of a statute in a consumer
protection action.
One hazard of relying upon the Schwab analysis of legislative intent is
the general inaccessibility of comprehensive state legislative history.40
Furthermore, the legislative history that is available may fail to provide any
clear indication of legislative intent on the narrow question of whether per
se consumer protection actions are authorized. For example, in early 1985,
a bill4' was introduced which would have explicitly linked the CPA with the
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, 42 the Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant
Act, 43 the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen Act, 44 and the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act. 45 The bill did not become law, and the reasons for its
rejection are unknown to the public. Yet, under the Schwab analysis, the
failure of that bill could prevent the use of any of those statutes in per se
consumer protection actions.
The court compounded the problems inherent in the Schwab analysis by
relying upon the comprehensive nature of the Residential Landlord-Tenant
Act to justify finding that the legislature did not intend the act to support a
per se consumer protection action. This reliance contradicts the principle
that the remedial provisions of the CPA are supplemental to other remedies
available at law. 46 Furthermore, commentators have questioned whether the
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act alone provides an adequate remedy to
individual tenants subjected to a pattern of violations by the landlord. 47
If the court intends to prevent the use of a statute under the per se doctrine
simply because the statute is comprehensive in nature, the Schwab decision
39. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 65, 691 P.2d 163, 170 (1984).
40. See Comment, Legislative History in Washington, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 571 (1984).
41. S. 4159, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1-4 (1985).
42. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 59.18 (1983).
43. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 59.20 (1983).
44. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 18.85 (1983).
45. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 63.14 (1983).
46. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 65, 691 P.2d 163, 170 (1984); MacCormack v. Robins
Constr., II Wn. App. 80, 82, 521 P.2d 761, 762 (1974).
47. See Clocksin, Washington's Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973. WASH. ST. BAR NEWS.
July 1973, at 4; Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Washington-Part 1, 49 WASH. L.
REV. 291, 296 (1974); Comment, Washington Tenant Remedies and the Consumer Protection Act, 10
GoNz. L. REV. 559, 561-63 (1975).
280
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will limit the number of statutes which can be applied in per se actions. The
court's reliance upon the comprehensive nature of a statute to help justify
the dismissal of a per se consumer protection action also creates uncer-
tainty concerning the continued application of the per se doctrine to
violations of other similarly comprehensive consumer-oriented statutes.
For example, the extremely comprehensive insurance code has been relied
upon as a basis for a per se action. 48 Under Schwab, however, violations of
the insurance code may be insufficient to allow the per se application of the
CPA.
2. Schwab's New Per Se Standard
The effect of Schwab on the traditional Reader's Digest standard49 is
unclear. In response to a perceived legislative intent that the Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act not be used to support per se consumer protection
actions, the court developed a new analysis without mentioning the prior
standard. In so doing, the court failed to provide clear guidance as to what
the per se doctrine will require in the future.
Analytically, the factors found determinative in Schwab were unrelated
to whether the defendant's conduct was illegal and against public policy.
Schwab thus appears to supplement the Reader's Digest standard and add a
new requirement to the establishment of a per se consumer protection
action. After Schwab, the revised per se standard might require not only
conduct that is illegal and against public policy, but also an indication from
the legislature that the statute violated provides an appropriate basis for per
se actions.
The court appears to be reluctant to find that conduct is per se unfair or
deceptive absent an explicit legislative declaration that the statute will
support per se consumer protection actions. 50 Such a requirement, how-
ever, contradicts the court's position that the insurance code, which does
not contain an explicit reference to the CPA, provides an appropriate basis
for per se consumer protection actions. 51 The court has even suggested that
a per se action may be based upon the violation of regulations promulgated
by the insurance commissioner, even though such regulations do not
48. See, e.g., Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wn. 2d 409, 693 P.2d 697 (1985);
Federated American Ins. Co. v. Strong, 102 Wn. 2d665,689 P.2d68 (1984);Saloisv. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).
49. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
50. The Schwab opinion provided a list of statutes containing an express link with the CPA. See
infra note 54 and accompanying text. The court then implied that where the legislature intended to
regulate other activities under the CPA, such regulation would have been provided through the
enactment of similar provisions. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 546-47, 693 P.2d at 110-11.
51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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contain an explicit link with the CPA or any declaration of the legislature's
intent. 52 If an explicit link is required under Schwab, the insurance code
and regulations may no longer be considered an appropriate basis for a per
se action.
While implying that an explicit link is now required, the court failed to
define exactly what type of link must be provided. In dicta, the court
provided a list of thirteen statutes53 which include "designated activities
within the ambit of the CPA." 54 Nine of the thirteen provisions listed, 55 and
at least four others not listed, 56 not only include the regulated activities
within the CPA, but also declare violations of the statute to be unfair or
deceptive practices under the CPA. Other provisions listed by the court
simply select the violations which might be used to support a per se
action. 57 In contrast, one of the provisions listed merely authorizes attorney
general enforcement under the CPA. 58 While each statutory variation goes
beyond including the activities regulated within the scope of the CPA, the
mere authorization of attorney general enforcement falls far short of declar-
ing that conduct in violation of the statute constitutes a violation of the CPA
or is per se unfair or deceptive. By stating that these provisions accomplish
only the inclusion of the activity within the CPA, the court disregarded the
differing language and intent of the provisions, and failed to indicate which
declarations will be considered sufficient to allow a per se action.
52. Federated American Ins. Co. v. Strong, 102 Wn. 2d 665, 676, 689 P.2d 68, 75 (1984).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.28.185 (1983) (debt adjusting); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.35.180 (1983)
(hearing aids); WASH. REV. CODE §18.39.350 (1983) (embalming and funerals); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.09.340 (1983) (charitable solicitations); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.036 (1983) (usurious con-
tracts); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.102.020 (1983) (chain distributor schemes); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.105.100 (1983) (camping clubs); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.130.060 (1984) (telephone equipment):
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.220 (1983) (motor vehicle practices): WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(3)
(1983) (discrimination); WASH. REV. CODE § 58.19.270 (1983) (land development); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 63.10.050 (1983) (consumer leases); WASH. REV. CODE § 64.36.170 (1983) (time share activities).
54. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 546, 693 P.2d at 110.
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.28.185 (1983) (debt adjusting); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.35.180 (1983)
(hearing aids); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.39.350 (1983) (embalming and funerals); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.09.340 (1983) (charitable solicitations); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.036 (1983) (usurious con-
tracts); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.102.020 (1983) (chain distributor schemes); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 58.19.270 (1983) (land development); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.10.050 (1983) (consumer leases):
WASH. REV. CODE § 64.36.170 (1983) (time share activities).
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.110.170 (1983) (business opportunity fraud); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28B.05.230 (1983) (educational services); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.71.070 (1983) (auto repair);
WASH. REV. CODE § 68.46.210 (1983) (prearrangement contracts).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.105.100 (1983) (camping clubs); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(3)
(1983) (discrimination). The list provided by the court failed to include three statutes which also provide
that selected violations will support a per se consumer protection action: WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.440
(1983) (collection agencies); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.190(l) (1983) (franchise investment): WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.22.440(2) (1983) (mobile home installation).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.220 (1983) (motor vehicle practices).
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3. The Effect of the Schwab Standard
If the legislature has specifically defined the exact relationship between a
statute and the CPA, the court should acknowledge that relationship. If,
however, the legislature has not explicitly defined the relationship, the
court now appears to be unwilling to find that conduct is per se unfair or
deceptive. In Schwab, the court put the legislature on notice that future per
se application of the CPA may be dependent upon explicit legislative
approval. While requiring an explicit declaration should enhance consis-
tency and predictability, this standard has two disadvantages. First, some
delay is inevitable before the legislature can fully react to the new standard.
Second, the political cost of amending all consumer-oriented statutes to
provide an express link to the CPA may be excessive. Until the legislature
has reacted to the new standard, litigants under the consumer protection act
can expect difficulty in establishing a per se consumer protection action
based upon any statute not containing an express link to the CPA.
B. Effect of Schwab on the Application of the CPA to Unfair and
Deceptive Practices Unregulated by Statute
In addition to modifying the per se doctrine, the Schwab court held that
all residential landlord-tenant conduct is excluded from the direct applica-
tion of the CPA, including misconduct not addressed by the Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act.59 This unprecedented exception created by the court
for landlord-tenant transactions is not justified by the court's analysis and
conflicts with the language of the CPA, 60 Washington precedent, 61 and the
59. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 553, 693 P.2d 113-14.
60. Although the CPA contains a provision which specifically states the legislative exemptions to
the act, no specific exemption is provided for landlord-tenant transactions. WASH. REv. CODE
§ 19.86.170. "Where a statute provides for a stated exception, no other exceptions will be assumed by
implication." Jepson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 89 Wn. 2d 394, 404, 573 P.2d 10, 16 (1977).
Furthermore, in WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.920 the court is instructed to liberally construe the terms of
the CPA.
61. The court failed to discuss the analysis applied in Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 691 P.2d
163 (1984), a case decided just three months prior to Schwab. In determining whether the CPA might
properly be applied to attorneys, the court in Short first looked for language in the CPA which expressly
included or excluded attorneys. Id. at 56, 691 P.2d at 165. Finding no express indication, the court
focused on whether the practice of law constituted trade or commerce. Id. at 60, 691 P.2d at 168. See,
Note, Washington Lawyers Under the Purview of the State Consumer Protection Act-the "Entrepre-
neurial Aspects" Solution, 60 WASH. L. REv. 923 (1985).
In Schwab, the trial court expressly found the rental of residential premises to be an activity in
commerce. State v. Schwab, No. 80-2-14524-0, slip op. at 6 (Wash. Super. Ct. King Co. Feb. 1, 1983).
Therefore, under the Short analysis, the direct application of the CPA would be allowed since the
conduct was within trade or commerce.
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result reached in other jurisdictions which have considered the issue.62
The court apparently intended to create a blanket exception for landlord-
tenant conduct. 63 This exception, however, could create difficulties that the
court may not have foreseen. Exempting landlord-tenant transactions from
the CPA produces the illogical result that practices recognized as unfair or
deceptive are prohibited by the CPA unless those practices are utilized in
the rental of residential housing. For example, bait-and-switch advertis-
ing 64 is prohibited by the CPA. 65 Under Schwab, however, bait-and-switch
advertising is now permitted in the rental of residential housing since the
CPA may not be applied to landlords. Schwab leaves residential tenants less
protected than commercial tenants since unfair or deceptive conduct is
actionable under the CPA in a commercial lease transaction, but such
conduct apparently is not actionable under Schwab if a residential lease is
involved. Yet it may be the less sophisticated residential tenant who is in
need of greater protection.
The landlord-tenant exception to the CPA also may cause problems for
antitrust regulation under the act. In addition to prohibiting unfair or
deceptive practices, the CPA also implements the Washington Constitu-
tion's prohibition of monopolies and other conduct in restraint of trade. 66
Application of the landlord-tenant exception in an antitrust action would
exclude landlords from these antitrust prohibitions, thus tacitly authorizing
landlord monopolies, price agreements, and other trade restraints under
state law. This result is obviously contrary to the legislature's intent and
undesirable as a matter of public policy.
62. Schwab, 103 Wn. 2d at 559, 693 P.2d at 116-17 (Dore, J., dissenting); see Conaway v. Prestia.
191 Conn. 484,464 A.2d 847 (1983); People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich, 108 Ill. App. 3d 83,438 N.E.2d
924 (1982): McGrath v. Mishara, 286 Mass. 74, 434 N.E.2d 1215 (1982); Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C.
App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1978); Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329
A.2d 812 (1974).
63. The state's motion for reconsideration of the exclusion of landlord-tenant conduct from the
direct application of the CPA was denied March 5, 1985. Interview with John R. Ellis, Deputy Attorney
General, Chief of the Consumer and Business Fair Practices Division of the Washington Attorney
General's Office, in Seattle, Washington (Oct. 18, 1985) (notes on file with the Washington Law
Review).
64. Bait-and-switch advertising is a practice designed to lure customers into the business by
advertising particular items which the business has no genuine intention of offering for sale. For
example, the court found bait-and-switch advertising in State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler
Plymouth, 87 Wn. 2d 298, 306, 553 P.2d 423, 430 (1976), when the defendant advertised cars which
were not available for sale.
65. Id. at 309, 553 P.2d at 432.
66. WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 22. "When originally passed in 1961, the Act was viewed primarily
as an antitrust statute incorporating the basic provisions of federal antimonopoly legislation." Boeder,
Consumer Case Indexing Project, WASI. ST. B. NEWS, June 1974, at 9. In addition, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 19.86.030-.050 (1983) prohibit monopolies, price fixing agreements, and other conduct in restraint
of trade. See generally, O'Connell, Washington Consumer Protection Act-Enforcement Provisions
and Policies, 36 WASH. L. REV. 279 (1961).
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The analytical and practical difficulties with this aspect of the decision
require legislative or judicial modification of the court's holding. Without
proper modification, the court's use of the legislative history analysis to
exclude landlord-tenant transactions gives the court the power to exempt
unpredictably and at will selected classes of businesses from the applica-
tion of the CPA. Pending modification, a cautious plaintiff may need to
show not only that the conduct complained of is within the scope of the
CPA, but also that it would be inappropriate for the court to exclude that
conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Schwab decision almost demands a legislative response. The court's
opinion obscures the per se standard to the point where a litigant cannot
reasonably expect the court to allow a per se action unless the legislature
has provided a clear link with the CPA. In response, the legislature must
evaluate the merits of incorporating such a link into each consumer-
oriented statute. In addition, the legislature needs to remind the court that
blanket exceptions to the CPA are drafted and enacted by the legislature,
not by the court. Consumer protection and antitrust regulation in Washing-
ton will be severely limited if the courts continue to arbitrarily exclude
entire classes of business from the CPA.
Lora L. Petso
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